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Abstract
This paper focuses on the Ink Jet Printing (IJP) industry in the vicinity of Cambridge,
UK, and explores the emergence and maturation of a knowledge-based cluster of
activity. The discussion is organised in terms of the origins and progeny of the firms
in the cluster and their business environment. The lineage of firms is examined with
reference to their technologies, spin-out activity and reasons for location near
Cambridge. Ecological issues are addressed with reference to production chains,
competition and new relations of ownership accompanying the globalisation of the
mature industry. It is shown that maturation of an industry can be followed by local
renewal, which in this case has accompanied recognition of the generic nature of the
ink jet technologies as an innovative process for the deposition of valuable substances
on substrates. Beyond the original printing and product identification industries, there
are wide applications for IJP, which extend to the emergence of intelligent materials.
Key words: Ink Jet Printing industry, high tech, cluster dynamics,
genealogical/ecological processes, renewal
4Introduction
Local clusters of technology-based firms have been of increasing interest to policy makers
and academic researchers. Recent cluster studies have moved from a mainly taxonomic
approach, characterising types of cluster, to a more dynamic analysis of the emergence and
development of local clusters of firms (Braunerhjelm and Feldman 2006; Menzel and Fornahl
2007). The activities of firms that make up a high tech cluster are distinctive and it is only by
understanding the processes through which constituent firms and clusters develop and mature
that we can gain understanding of collective trends. We define a cluster as a local
concentration of firms that have horizontal (ecological) and/or vertical (genealogical)
relations. In this paper we focus on the Ink Jet Printing (IJP) industry in the vicinity of
Cambridge, UK, to explore the nature of maturation of a local knowledge-based (high tech)
cluster. The Cambridge region is well known as a high tech centre (Garnsey and Heffernan
2005), made up of diverse clusters of mainly small knowledge based firms. What makes IJP
distinctive in the area is that it has no direct university lineage and has achieved international
market reach by anticipating and responding to global demand, resulting in several firms
which are larger than other technology based firms in the area. The local ink jet printing
industry more than doubled in size during the 1990s, growing at a much faster rate than the
Cambridge tech cluster as a whole.
We organise our discussion in terms of genealogical and ecological issues. We examine the
lineage of firms with reference to their technologies, spin-out activity and location near
Cambridge. We address ecological issues with reference to production chains, competition
and new relations of ownership accompanying the maturation of the international industry.
We show how renewal has accompanied recognition of the generic nature of ink jet
technologies as an innovative process for the deposition of valuable substances on substrates,
with applications that include intelligent materials.
5Cluster dynamics
Orthodox economic theory does not address the issue of whether firms reproduce or replicate,
but geographers and regional economists have shown interest in this issue. In what follows
we summarise what is known about evolutionary processes in local clusters. While dynamic
approaches to clusters1 are still rare, prior work is useful in pointing to ecological processes of
interaction and genealogical processes of replication in the development of clusters (Baum
and Singh 1994). The genealogy of organizational evolution – the structures of organizational
inheritance and speciation - can be traced through new firms that spin-off from other
organizations (cf. Garnsey et al. 2008). This process is very localised, as most new firms are
sited in the region in which the founder has worked and/or lived (Stam 2007). Ecological
processes involve interaction with other firms which are suppliers and customers in shared
value chains. This is the vertical dimension of clusters and involves, for example, input-
output relations with customers and suppliers (Maskell 2005). The cluster may also consist of
firms carrying out similar activities as competitors in the same product-market or drawing on
the same pool of labour. Such processes of interaction are not always in proximity; labour
markets tend to be local but also transcend the locality, drawing in labour from elsewhere. For
specialised high tech firms, competition in product-markets is to be expected from outside the
region rather than within the region. Firms may also have interaction with firms in other
populations that have dissimilar but complementary capabilities and activities (cf. Richardson
1972). These ecological and genealogical processes contribute to the competence base of the
region (cf. Lawson 1999), through processes of collective learning (Keeble et al. 1999).
The literature has recognised three phases of cluster emergence. First, writers have pointed to
the more or less ‘random’ location of early entrants. This chance location of successful early
entrants sets in motion a self-reinforcing mechanism. The second phase of cluster emergence
is said to be shaped by a spin-off process of new firms originating from successful early
entrant firms (Klepper 2007; Arthur 1994). Third, there is the attraction of firms and
investment from outside the area.
The first phase is said to involve random location of early entrants in the sense that the
founding entrepreneurs just happen to be located there. Entrant firms are likely to be founded
by local entrepreneurs originating from related industries or knowledge bases. Not all regions
have the same probability of being the home region of an emerging cluster. The incubator
organizations of these early entrants and of the emerging cluster can be firms, but also public
                                                 
1 There is a related literature on the life cycles of industries (see Klepper 1997), but this has no explicit
spatial dimension (implicitly it is perhaps the nation that is taken as the context of analysis: see Vernon
1966).
6research organizations. Universities and research laboratories often provide the initial
knowledge base (including both scientific and technological knowledge and skilled labour)
for the emergence and growth of entrepreneurial clusters (Braunerhjelm and Feldman 2006).
Early entrants are more likely to be successful if originating from related local industries
(Audia et al. 2006; Boschma and Wenting 2007).
The second phase involves spin-off processes from some successful early entrants (cf. Arthur
1994 for a stylized model of agglomeration by spin-off). These successful early entrants may
settle and expand, to become ‘anchor firms’ (Feldman 2003; Lazerson and Lorenzoni 2005;
Klepper 2007). A study of biotech clusters in the US by Romanelli and Feldman (2006: 105)
found that the start-up of new firms by entrepreneurs from other biotech firms is critical to the
overall growth of the cluster. Only those regional clusters that exhibit second-generation
growth, i.e. spin-offs created from the early entrants, grow to substantial size in comparison to
other potential regional clusters. The Schumpeterian (1934) logic is that clusters grow when
the knowledge and other resources created by the early firms are combined and recombined
by entrepreneurs who originate from the early entrants. Second-generation activity stimulates
diversity of activity because spinoffs tend to avoid direct competition with the company of
origin, as illustrated by spin-off firms of Acorn Computers in Cambridge (Garnsey and
Heffernan 2005; Garnsey et al. 2008).
In the third phase identified in the literature, investment and talent is attracted from outside
the cluster. Investments may include multinational firms investing in the region, or
entrepreneurs moving to the area to set up a new independent firm. In addition, ‘magnet
organizations’ (Harrison et al. 2004) attract talented people from outside the locality. These
people may move to other firms or start up their own firm nearby later in their career.
We look for evidence from our case history to confirm or challenge these predicted trends.
Although we find the evidence to be largely congruent with the three phase model outlined
above, developments moved beyond these accounts and expansion was followed by further
phases of maturation and renewal. We argue that these further phases require attention - in
knowledge-based no less than in rustbelt regions - to inform policy and practice.
Research design and data
On the basis of the initial conceptual model sketched out above, drawn from the literature, our
research questions first focused on the following: “How, if at all, has spin-off of new firms
from old contributed to the evolution of the local ink jet printing industry in the Cambridge
7area?” These questions are specified in terms of constructs that depict the emergence and
maturation processes of a local industrial cluster. Genealogical processes (influences over
time) are examined on the basis of evidence on firm spin-offs in the IJP sector and the
accumulation of technological knowledge by firms. Ecological processes (spatial
connections) are examined through evidence concerning horizontal and vertical relations of
firms in the IJP cluster.
These constructs (genealogical and ecological processes) are operationalised on the basis of
evidence that is both quantitative and qualitative data. Evidence on IJP firms is derived in the
form of data from the Cambridge University Engineering Department high-tech database,
which includes all establishments in high tech industries in Cambridgeshire in the period
1988-2006. Data on their patents is derived from the database of the European Patent Office.
For in-depth information on key firms in the Cambridgeshire IJP industry, case study analysis
was undertaken. Seven in-depth case studies were undertaken with IJP companies at different
stages of development (Table 1). The cases selected cover the leading firms in the
Cambridgeshire IJP industry (CCL, Domino, Linx, Xaar, Xennia, and Inca) and some spin-
offs from these IJP firms in closely related industries (Biodot, Inkski). The research strategy
was based on semi-structured interviews of senior level personnel and on direct observation
during student projects, together with archival evidence, press reports and company websites.
The study was undertaken over an extensive period – 1995-2008 - addressing the problem of
retrospective bias (cf. Garnsey et al 2008).
Table 1. Case study IJP companies in the Cambridge area
Company Number of
employees*
Year of
founding
SIC code Core activities
Cambridge
Consultants Ltd
213 1960 7310 Technology consulting
Domino Printing
Sciences
550 1978 3002 Coding & marking printers,
laser marking
Linx Printing
Technologies
245 1987 3002 Coding & marking printers,
laser marking
Xaar Group 80 1990 7310 Development of DoD
printing, manufacturing of
industrial printheads
Biodot Ltd (4) 1994 3320 Rapid Diagnostic test
devices, Biosensors and
BioChip Arrays
Xennia 30 1996 7310 Contract ink development,
test equipment
Inca Digital 100 2000 2956 Digital printing
Inkski Ltd 1 2004 7310 Development of non-impact
digital printing technology
* at the Cambridgeshire sites in 2006
8Ink Jet Printing is the collective name for a variety of different techniques to generate droplets
of ink, which are propelled towards a surface to produce a printed mark. These include
continuous (binary, multi-level, greyscale), Drop-on-Demand (DoD) / Valve jet (shutter,
array) and impulse jet (piezo activated and chevron) ink jet printing techniques (Garnsey and
Minshall, 2000, pp 18-19). Drop-on-demand ink jet printing is a complex technology that
converts full pages of electronic text and images into tens of millions of signals, via
individual ink jet nozzles in the print head for reproduction. Ink jet printing embodies many
different skills and technologies: digital image processing, micro-machine semiconductor
processing, mechanical, control, and electronic system design, computational fluid dynamics,
chemistry of ink and paper, and precision manufacturing. These technologies have been
applied in a wide range of industries and markets that can benefit from the key features of ink
jet printing which are that it provides: non-impact / contact process for printing; infinitely
variable output on demand; and high speed and high resolution (Garnsey and Minshall 2000).
In the late 1980s and early 1990s ink jet printing disrupted dot matrix printing, then the
dominant design in desktop printing,. The ink jet printing industry grew rapidly in the 1990s,
with a 6-year average growth rate of 73.3% in the period 1990-1995 and an average annual
growth rate of 14.4% in the second half of the 1990s (Clymer and Asaba 2008). The global
IJP industry, encompassing office and home printers, emerged in the 1970s. It illustrated three
phases of development, entering a second growth phase in the 1990s, with a maturation phase
in the late 1990s (see figure 1).  Industrial ink jet printing for product identification was at
first a niche market overlooked by the main players and offering an opening to alert new
entrant firms (Penrose 1995).
Source: Clymer and Asaba (2008: 140)
9Figure 1. Three phases in the global ink jet printer industry
The ink jet printing industry is divided between the products developed for industrial
applications (marking, labelling and coding for production lines), printing applications
(commercial printing) and home and office equipment applications (desktop printing; e.g.
provided by HP and Canon). In addition, selling inks can make a substantial contribution to
revenues over the lifetime of a printer. The Cambridge firms specialised in the first two
applications and markets, together with inks. Further to this there has been a recent shift to
laser printing. In the next section we describe the development of the IJP industry in the
Cambridge region.
Cambridge Ink Jet Printing Industry: emergence, growth and maturation
The local inkjet printing industry can be traced to one organization, the technical design
consultancy Cambridge Consultants Ltd (CCL). At the start of the 1970s CCL, a spin-off
from the University of Cambridge, was working on various continuous ink jet printing
technologies for the chemical multinational ICI. CCL was contracted to develop ink jet
technologies for printing textiles at high speed, over wide widths and in colour. ICI withdrew
from this project a few years later on the advice of external consultants when it became clear
that the level of complexity required to achieve their quality and cost targets had been
underestimated (reflecting the nascent phase of the IJP technology at that time). However, the
project manager at CCL, Graeme Minto, saw the commercial potential in ink jet printing.
Graeme Minto obtained support from CCL to spin out the technology in a new company
founded in 1978: Domino Printing Sciences. Domino was an independent start up which took
over the intellectual property in the technology from ICI and CCL.
In the 1980s the cluster was dominated by CCL and Domino Printing Sciences, which made
up almost 100% of the IJP employment in the region (see figure 2). In the 1990s – the growth
phase of the international IJP industry – a number of further spin-offs occurred by former
employees of CCL, partly motivated by the success of Domino. These included Linx,
Videojet, Xaar, and Inca (see figures 2 and 3). These firms achieved global expansion on the
basis of a set of related technologies. The local IJP industry more than doubled from the late
1980s to the early 2000s, reaching a size of more than 1,300 employees. Employment in the
local industry decreased somewhat following 2000, as in the overall global IJP industry that
entered the maturity phase in the late 1990s (Clymer and Asaba 2008).
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Figure 2. Employment in the Cambridgeshire Ink Jet Printing industry
Source: Cambridge University Engineering Department high-tech database
The early growth of the local industry was stimulated by new European legislation relating to
consumer information on food, drink and pharmaceutical packaging, and factory automation
gathering momentum. Regulation led to rapid growth in the demand for production line
labelling and coding equipment. Interstices in the wider IJP industry, where the market for
home and office printers dominated, were created by this new regulation. Incumbent firms
were stretched by the home and office printer markets and left a product identification market
to new entrants in a manner anticipated by the account given by Penrose (1959) of
opportunities for new firms in emerging industries. The need for flexible systems for applying
variable data at speed became critical as food, drink and pharmaceutical industries increased
their reach into global markets where minor variations in national legislation necessitated
differing information on packaging. The legislation was serendipitous for Domino. Although
they had not anticipated this development they exploited the potential demand that it
represented.
Genealogical processes
The lineage of the IJP companies in Cambridge is shown in Figure 3. Two inkjet printing
companies not located in the Cambridge region are Imaje in France and Willett in Corby
(UK). The companies were dominant in international markets for non-impact product
identification, which is a smaller market than the larger market for desktop ink jet printing.
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Figure 3. Lineage of Ink Jet Companies in Cambridgeshire
The group of Cambridge IJP firms formed organically after spin out from CCL or its
descendants. Interviews with founders of companies showed that the most prominent factor
for the original choice of location in the Cambridge area was the unwillingness of the
founders to relocate. This does not confirm the prediction of the model that the location of the
cluster is initially random, however. There are causal factors at work in the attractions of
residence in a university city and in family ties obstructing mobility, leading to structured
rather than random incentives to co-locate spin off companies.
Spin off companies must continually innovate and develop new technology and products. The
inherited technology and expertise lose importance as this occurs and early ties weaken. We
expected linkages between incubator organisation and spin off company to diminish as the
spin off company creates its own value chain. We found this to be the case; CCL lost its links
with the University of Cambridge, Xaar and other spin offs reduced contact with CCL and
Xennia had weakened links with its company of origin, Domino.
In order to achieve reliability and keep ahead of competition, the IJP companies patented their
innovations (figure 4). The patent data provides a proxy measure of the steady growth of
technical capability in the local cluster.
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Figure 4. Cumulative Patents for the Cambridgeshire Inkjet Printing companies
Source: European Patent Office
Among inkjet printing patents and other related patents reported for the IJP companies, 55%
are made up of inkjet printing patents and 45% of patents in other or related areas. Five (71%)
of the firms are specialising in inkjet printing equipment patents. Two companies had most of
their patents in other applications for example in inks. We can infer cumulative development
of  business skills as well as technical expertise as the scale of operations increased.
Ecological processes
There are no close formal links between the companies, which are largely in competition with
each other. Interviews did, however, reveal examples of informal knowledge transfer.
Knowledge is also transferred through the work of the consultancy Pivotal Resources and by
the Ink Jet Academy, a local training course for employees in the IJP and related industries.
The movement of personnel between IJP firms is extensive, as measured by manager moves.
For example among seven senior staff at Xennia, five had previously worked for inkjet
printing companies. Personnel have also moved to inkjet printing companies outside the
Cambridge area. Much of the informal social contact has occurred amongst those employed in
the Cambridge IJP companies through social networks. For example Graeme Minto met Alan
Barrell, who succeeded him as CEO of Domino, through a swimming club. Formal
relationships between the Cambridge firms using IJP technology have only emerged recently
through the creation of an R&D consortium, as will be discussed later.
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As markets expanded, competition became increasingly intense. Barriers to entry for
competitor firms were not high. Key competitors included Videojet (USA) and Hitachi
(Japan). Domino, Videojet (including Willett) and Linx were already competing directly in
product identification markets. Inca is an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and
produces machines for different applications. Xaar produces print heads and Xennia’s activity
involves inks, so these two firms operate at different stages in the supply chain. Partnerships
in the area between complementary firms are predictably more common than among
competing firms; Xaar, in particular, has relationships with a number of other companies.
Cambridge firms are affected by competition from outside the region. Competition between
two leading print head manufacturers and licensers, Xaar (Cambridge) and Spectra (now
FUJIFIM Dimatix, USA) is an example of this. These firms started around the same time and
competition between them has been a development driver. There was entry into the industry
from other sectors by well resourced players including Danaher (US).
Industrial IJP is a small part of the international ink jet printing industry and specialist
suppliers have not been drawn to the area (the US firm Micropump being an exception).
Manufacturing operations of the IJP companies are largely assembly operations with parts
increasingly outsourced, apart from core technology such as the print head. A large number of
suppliers is used by each firm and these encompass a wide range of different types of
operation. The Cambridge IJP companies use both local and international suppliers. When
Domino was founded, there was a policy of working closely with small suppliers in the region
and Domino were able to upgrade local suppliers by passing on equipment to them and
treating them as an extension of their own activities.
Increasingly, however, suppliers came to be chosen for quality and product price rather than
location. For example, Spectra (US) print heads are used by many inkjet companies instead of
Xaar heads (Spectra heads produce higher resolution prints than Xaar, as required for certain
applications). This shift reflects the rise of low cost global manufacturing centres in the Far
East and improved communications. We were told in interviews that at the time of the
founding of earlier ink jet companies, parts could not be sourced internationally because of
quality issues and the difficulty of transfer of design and blueprint materials. The ease with
which computer aided design (CAD) drawings can be transferred digitally has changed the
supplier-customer relationship. Local suppliers, who lacked funds to invest in design
capability, have not been able to upgrade to satisfy OEMs. Thus the volume of parts sourced
locally has decreased over time although local suppliers remain important to the IJP
companies and are often used for non specialist and lower value parts, such as casings,
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printed circuit boards (PCBs) and small components; larger assemblies and specialist parts are
sourced further away. Local suppliers are involved with a range of industries and their
products tend to be generic. Suppliers of parts such as metalwork, for example, are located
near to Cambridge, whereas ink suppliers are further away. Companies generally look for
local suppliers before looking further afield. From both the customer and supplier perspective,
proximity is helpful, especially at the development stage, but may be superseded by cost
considerations. Where production is capital intensive, the high cost of capital in the UK rather
than local labour costs is a major disincentive to local production (IfM, 2005). US and
Japanese competitors do not enjoy lower labour costs.
As markets for IJP expanded globally, the production chain of the Cambridge ink jet printing
firms became international. Initially there was a local production chain as local suppliers were
supported and came to be shared by several firms, even those in competition with each other.
We have seen that Domino in particular helped suppliers to upgrade their performance and
these contractors were used by other local customers in the area to upgrade their products and
production processes. Sub-assemblies have come to be sourced internationally as the industry
has matured.  Supplier relations have emerged with firms in other countries in a global
production ecosystem. Ink jet printing firms source jewels from Switzerland, pumps from the
United States and precision components from many other areas.
Market reach was extended through further innovation, in recognition of changing market
needs. The Cambridge inkjet printing businesses realised that technologies initially used to
provide time-dependent product information for the consumer could provide additional value
to customers through further applications. They could be used to improve efficiency of
production and distribution processes. Technologies used to apply ‘best before’ dates for food
packaging could also be used to improve product traceability by printing batch information.
As well as the products themselves, ink jet printing technologies were applied to packaging of
drink, food and pharmaceuticals. An example of this was the labelling of individual soft
gelatine drug capsules using edible inks.
There were also markets in the distribution of newspapers and magazines where inkjet
marking, coding and labelling could be used. For addressing, personalising and coding
purposes, prior to distribution, IJP made it possible to add variable information. The benefit
of technologies for marking products within the factory was seen by firms operating many
other production processes, varying from healthcare products to electronics. With new
demands for more reliable and flexible systems, inkjet technologies were developed and
adapted to cope with these.
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Thus the market for the application of ink jet technologies has differentiated into a number of
sectors as the industry has matured.  Firms in the Cambridge area have made a considerable
effort to renew their technologies, as shown by the high level of patenting. Efficiency in
existing markets has also been improved. The development of wide web drop-on-demand
technologies provides an example. These have had success in product identification and label
printing applications but the anticipated revolution in printing and publications markets has
not yet occurred.
The expansion to additional locations has allowed the cluster to reach international markets.
Around eighty percent of the Cambridge ink jet printing companies’ markets are abroad and
survival depends on the ability to sell products world wide. Links with international
customers and distributors have been developed and since applications for ink jet printing are
very specific and customised, a local customer service base has been necessary for the
customer interface. As a result there is investment in the global presence with companies
having international offices. Biodot has moved its headquarters to the US, while Xaar, and
Videojet ceased to manufacture in the area and others such as Linx and Domino manufacture
at international locations in addition to the Cambridge area. There is an extensive distributor
network through which ink jet printing companies sell their products but none of these
distributors are shared by the companies.
Thus the Cambridge area IJP sector is not an industrial district with a local production web,
but a cluster of firms related mainly by their origins and shared labour pool. What  then are
the advantages to these firms of being in a local cluster?2 Specialist suppliers are no longer a
major consideration. But a shared labour market pool and the transfer of tacit knowledge can
be a major benefit of proximity. The people, skills and informal knowledge base in the area
are a significant benefit of being located near to other IJP firms. The Cambridge address and
the prestige associated have also been a consideration in retaining firms in the area. The
amplification effects of co-location are apparent in multi-generational effects. Spin-off firms
became the source of further spin-offs and attraction of entrepreneurs and firms from outside
the region. This latter process has been associated with the third phase of cluster dynamics
identified in prior literature: maturation.
The Cambridge IJP firms were pioneers in targeting the industrial product identification
market in which larger US and Japanese firms had not shown interest initially. The further
                                                 
2 Willett, a spin out from CCL, was located in Corby, with only the R&D unit in Cambridge, suggesting that not
all firms saw benefits in co-location.
16
expansion of these markets resulted in new and better resourced international competitors
moving into this sector on a global basis. With increased competition and consolidation of the
product identification sector of IJP, there has been a rash of mergers and acquisitions of local
ink jet printing firms in the Cambridge area.
Figure 5. IJP firms acquired
In 2001 there were seven industrial inkjet printing companies operating in the Cambridge
area. Currently (2009), only two of these companies (Domino and Xaar) have not been
acquired. The Danaher Corporation had created their product identification division through
takeovers of Videojet (2002), Willett (2003) and Linx (2005), and Dainippon Screen
Manufacturing Company bought out Inca in June 2005. The Elmjet site, acquired by Videojet,
was closed after a further acquisition by Danaher in 2002, while the manufacturing function
of Xaar was relocated to Sweden after a merger. In 2008 Xennia was taken over by Ten Cate
from the Netherlands, leaving only two substantial independent players in the Cambridge IJP
industry (Domino and Xaar).
There are different views on implications of acquisition. Proponents point to local benefits of
capital inflow and the introduction of managerial expertise and marketing power of larger
international companies. Critics see negative impacts of loss of independence on the local
supplier network, personnel mobility, and attraction of business and personnel. On the other
hand, post acquisition spin-off activity can be a source of innovation and a shift into emerging
areas via new applications. These new applications indicate a renewal of the cluster, a phase
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that is not clearly recognised in the prior literature on cluster dynamics. We discuss this phase
in the next section.
Cambridge Ink Jet Printing Industry: Renewal
Over time there has been recognition that jet printing technologies have very wide
applications, well beyond printing and product identification. New applications are to some
extent a response to the maturation of  ink jet printing. Continuous IJP, once the foundational
technology in the Cambridgeshire ink jet printing industry, is now a mature technology. It
was first threatened by drop-on-demand printing and more recently by laser technologies.
Domino Printing Sciences has purchased several laser companies in order to gain expertise in
a competing technology. The markets served by continuous ink jet printing are established
and sustainable and all the companies involved have mitigated threats by developing
competencies in the two emerging technologies. Drop on demand printing is a developing
technology with rapid progress still being made in terms of performance and reliability,
giving rise to new markets through performance improvement. But these markets have
differentiated needs and it is difficult for companies to diversify across applications in the
face of capital constraints and significant market differences. If cluster companies are to
compete across new markets, further R&D and strategic partnerships will be essential. One
important development in this respect is the initiative to set up the IJP research centre at the
University of Cambridge.
We saw that the stage model of cluster emergence and growth reviewed in the first part of this
paper does not address the kind of renewal of local industry through a move from specialist to
generic technological applications, as has occurred among Cambridge ink jet printing
activities.
Despite the loss of independence of several IJP firms and the move of many manufacturing
operations away from the area, it is likely that Cambridge will continue as a centre for R&D.
One reason for this is the localized accumulation of knowledge on ink jet technologies and
related display technologies. Another is the initiative to set up the Inkjet Research Centre at
the University of Cambridge in 2005. This centre has been funded by the UK government
through the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and through
industrial partners. Other universities in the UK are in the consortium and the companies
involved (including Sun Chemical, Sericol, Xaar, Fujifilm, Domino, Inca, Linx and CDT)
originate mostly from the Cambridge area. The Inkjet Research Centre intends to develop
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understanding of the fundamental behaviour of liquids in environments presented in inkjet
printing. The aim of the project is to reduce duplicated research in local companies and to
spread the financial burden on the one hand, and to deepen the knowledge of inkjet
performance and broadening knowledge about potential applications of the technology on the
other. This represents the reconnection of the IJP cluster to the Engineering Department at the
University of Cambridge from which it originated several decades earlier. This should help
the cluster to be sustained into the future and to add cohesion and build reputation. The
development of the consortium has raised many challenges. For example, difficulties arose in
the formation of the consortium around the acquisition of Linx by the US company, Danaher.
Domino expressd concern that the takeover would mean that knowledge shared through the
Research Centre would migrate to the US through Linx and the cluster would not realise the
rewards. In order to address this issue contracts require that participating companies  maintain
or increase their level of R&D investment and deployment in the area – failure to do so
leading to removal from the group.
Development of technology in this direction requires a return to basic research. Although
inkjet has been a printing technology for more than 50 years, the processes involved are still
not completely understood. With modern inkjet printing, droplets are generated at high speeds
with fluids containing significant levels of particulates including metals. There is a significant
research agenda in elucidating the way IJP can be used to deposit a wide range of substances
on varied substrates.
Inkjet technology can be used to develop markets for low cost electronic goods as instanced
by disposable radio frequency identification (RFID) chips. This has required complementary
research at the University’s Auto ID Centre.3 The Xennia case study (see appendix, p. 27)
provides an example of a new printer technique with applications in RFID. The development
has involved Xennia with Carcio, a British company which has pioneered a way to print
conductive inks with a digital inkjet printer. When Carcio was working on a way to customise
cell phones, by printing personal images on the plastic bodies, it commissioned Xennia to find
a way to print metallic inks with an inkjet printer. Xennia developed a novel approach which
could also print on copper. Carcio and Xennia formed a joint venture called CIT (Conductive
Inkjet Technology) to hold the patents for the new technology. The new printing technique
could have an important impact on the RFID industry since it could replace the etching
process used for making copper antennas which creates toxic waste and is expensive. Other
new species of technology have emerged from new technology combinations, with firms
                                                 
3 See www.ifm.eng.cam.ac.uk/automation
19
spinning off from the Physics Cavendish Laboratories using jet printing of polymers for
display markets, building on and related to the local knowledge, skills and competences in ink
jet technologies. Cambridge Display Technology is the leading company in this area.
Figure 6 shows that over time, the IJP sector has grown more rapidly than the average for
Cambridge-area technology sectors, shown at the base of the figure by a diamond trend
marker.  The sector has also sustained growth better than the more volatile opto-electronics or
technical design consultancies.
Figure 6 is defective - To be replaced by figure from source
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Figure 6  The Growth of firms in IJP compared to growth of other sectors in the
Cambridge Cluster  (source Evans and Garnsey 2009)
The inkjet printing technologies are now being applied to ever more diverse areas. One
application is in the production of printed circuit boards where the very precise delivery of
conducting material onto an insulating substrate is required (display technologies). Plastic
Logic (PL) is a leading firm in this new sector, which has retained R&D activities in
Cambridge although PL’s manufacturing plant has been built in Dresden, Saxony, with the
aid of extensive German government subsidies.
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Conclusions
The history of the Cambridge IJP industry reveals some of the mechanisms underlying the
dynamic nature of local clusters. The first phase of the cluster started with the Cambridge
University spin-off firm CCL undertaking research into IJP in the early 1970s as part of work
for ICI. However, this research was not commercialised, and it was only after one of its
employees started a focussed IJP firm – Domino Printing Sciences – in 1978 that the local
industry started to expand. CCL has remained an import incubator of new firms in the IJP
industry, together with its first spin out, Domino. A second, growth  phase of the cluster took
place in the 1990s, when a second and third generation of spin-offs emerged, with several
substantial firms. A third phase was ushered in with the consolidation of the global industry,
reflected in a wave of acquisitions of local companies by foreign firms. The very success of
the sector has attracted acquirers looking to extend their own innovative portfolios with easy
credit for acquisition available during the boom period. A specialist activity for which there is
international demand cannot be immune to the forces of globalisation.
 The case reveals the way genealogy can be the basis for a cluster through common origins
and a shared labour market pool even where there are minimal local production relations. The
local ecology evolved gradually, eventually to be dominated by the labour market pool that
emerged in the area. This represents knowledgeable supply, but it only remains local because
of career opportunities provided in the area by a number of firms, which offer promotion and
skill extension possibilities, and the attractions the area offers to residents.
Although certain IJP firms have moved their production operations away from Cambridge to
other countries in Europe and America, they have maintained R&D operations at Cambridge.
This has brought the cluster back into interaction with the university, from which the parent
company, CCL, spun out in the 1960s. With the expansion of potential markets for inkjet
products, speed and precision requirements have moved beyond the current state of the art.
The need for new applications to open up new markets and recognition that ink jet printing
has much wider potential than had yet been realised has resulted in re-involvement with the
university after several decades when the IJP firms operated quite autonomously in the
business sphere. Renewal has been achieved through recognition of the generic nature of IJP
as a deposition technology for valuable materials including intelligent materials.
Renewal is taking place through co-operative efforts between academics and IJP companies.
This phase of renewal goes beyond the logic of current models of industry life cycles and
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cluster dynamics, which emphasise inevitable decline in the maturity phase of the industry
and cluster respectively. In line with recent attempts to explain the long term performance of
regions (Bathelt, 2001; Glaeser 2005; Martin and Sunley 2006), we recognize that regions can
‘reinvent’ themselves and escape the inevitable decline of maturing industries by building
new industries on the knowledge accumulated in earlier expanding industries. Firms in newly
emerging sectors are drawing employees from IJP firms in the area. When IJP technologies
were adopted by new entrants who developed advanced materials such as light emitting
polymers (Cambridge Display Technology and Plastic Logic) they were able to hire
professional staff with experience in the local IJP industry, demonstrating the role of job
mobility in the diffusion of competence in the area. Recognition of the generic nature of jet
based technologies for purposes of deposition, and the need for advanced R&D to realise new
opportunities, illustrates to the way new technological trajectories emerge as old technologies
diffuse and mature.
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APPENDIX
Case Studies
Case study findings for seven companies in the Ink Jet Printing cluster are summarised below.
Domino Printing Sciences4
Domino was built around products utilising single jet ink jet technology, with CCL
continuing to develop multi-jet versions. In its infancy Domino was supported and nurtured
by CCL and development work continued to be undertaken for them following spin off. A
licence agreement allowed the company non-exclusive access to CCL know-how and patents
enabling it to manufacture and sell inkjet systems. In return CCL received royalties on sales
of all Domino products and was entitled to grant licences to other companies if sales fell
below a certain threshold (Domino was obliged to offer CCL 'first refusal' on development
programmes for further inkjet products).
The company went public in 1985 with an initial valuation of £26m rising to £40m and in the
same year the company received the Queen's Award for innovation. Domino's machines
consist of a collection of electronics which guide the ink nozzles and, because they are
operated by electro-magnetic impulses and not by compressed air, the machine can be
installed in a small metal or plastic cabinet. The essential elements of the machine are the
microprocessors and their development and Domino has spent most of its time developing
this part of the business rather than construction of machines. Continued leverage of
connections with CCL was attempted and in 1987 a new company called Elmjet spun off
from CCL exploiting further technologies developed originally as part of the ICI project. This
new spinoff had the aim to design and manufacture wide web full colour printings and
Domino's chairman and founder, Graeme Minto, also acted as company chairman. Through
Domino being an investor in Elmjet and the latter being contracted to develop new printing
devices to complement and extend the range of Domino products, the two businesses were
linked not only by their personnel.
Domino now employs over one thousand people world wide and continues to develop, sell
and support industrial ink jet and laser printing systems for international packaging and
printing markets and remains a major player in the industrial ink jet printing industry. Most of
Domino’s activities are in product development and marketing (the company's operations are
concerned with product development and subsidiaries (specifically Domino Amjet) focus on
                                                 
4 This case is largely based on Garnsey and Minshall (2000).
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marketing the product in Europe). Domino's marketing orientation led it into a joint
distribution deal with American Technologies Incorporate (ATI) and exploitation of A. B.
Dicks European weaknesses of poor after sales services. Domino has stressed quality and
flexibility, instituted a rigorous programme of product development, concentrated on
developing its research and development (R&D) capability, encouraged strong co-ordination
among functions in R&D, product development and marketing, and nurtured strong co-
operation from its distribution channels, especially in the US with ATI, and in Europe after
the formation of Domino Amjet. There has been a recent shift to laser printing with Domino
buying US and German laser firms.
BioDot Ltd5
One of the smallest ink jet printing companies in the area is BioDot, which was founded as a
spinoff from Domino in 1994. The company was formed following Philip Shaw, an employee
of Domino Printing Sciences, taking redundancy who concluded an agreement with Domino
granting him access to IP relating to enzyme printing. It was agreed that the company would
not produce inkjet printers and Domino would supply components and not produce enzyme
printers. The company supplies non-contact nanoliter and low microliter dispensing
equipment for the development and manufacture of BioChip Arrays, Biosensors and Rapid
Diagnostic test devices. The core technology has descended from ink jet printing. The
company was presented with many challenges when starting and there was a need to learn
how to build an inkjet machine but advice fortunately came from former colleagues at
Domino. One of the early orders came from Domino concerning manufacture of a special
application machine allowing rapid change over of inks. This helped the firm's early cash
flow situation. The operating costs were covered by revenues within the first years despite the
challenges.
In March 1994 Biodot commenced trading and included Selwyn Image a colleague at
Domino who took a 5% stake in the business, but left soon afterwards moving to Willet,
another Cambridge based ink jet firm, since he found himself more suited to working in a
large business.
It was estimated by Philip Shaw that he needed £45,000 to start up the firm - he had £20,000
in redundancy compensation from Domino and it was found difficult to raise more money.
This arose due to venture capitalists not being interested in investing small amounts; few
venture capitalists were active at this time and there was reluctance by banks to invest in
                                                 
5 This case is largely based on Garnsey (2002)
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technology based ventures. There was also the need for premises. Since rents were high in
Cambridge the company found premises in Diddington, near St Neots. Although the contract
did not include right of renewal the company stayed there without additional capital through
having low cost premises and dealing with company matters in house. Biodot moved its
European headquarters from Huntingdon to a larger site in Chichester (West Sussex) in 2005.
Its global headquarters is now located in Irvine (California, US).
Linx Printing Technologies plc6
Linx Printing Technologies plc was founded in 1987 by two former members of the
Cambridge Consultants ink jet team at Willett, to exploit legislation driven marking/coding
opportunities in the United Kingdom (UK) and the European market. The company is
involved particularly in the manufacture and marketing of ink jet and laser coders to a range
of global industry sectors including food, beverage, pharmaceutical, and industrial customers
for 'on-line' variable information marking/coding. Linx Printing Technologies has been a
developer of industrial coding and marking equipment, based on ink jet and laser
technologies, used to print variable information such as serial numbers and 'sell-by' dates on
products and product packaging at manufacturing line speeds. Following the company being
founded (venture capital backed), main market flotation took place in 1992 and a FTSE
fledgling stock in 2004. In 1999 the company acquired a Chinese distributor and in 2000
acquired Xymark, the laser company, from GSI-Lumonics. The company was acquired by the
Danaher Corporation (USA)7 for £85m ($171 million) in 2005. It has about 718 employees
worldwide and it had estimated revenues of £52.1m in 2004. The company has five locations
with two sites in the UK (St Ives and Hull), one in France, one in the USA and two in China.
By operating through direct subsidiaries, representing 50% of total revenues, and a worldwide
network of specialist distributors, Linx has served a global customer base in a wide range of
manufacturing industries. For the Linx product range major overseas markets have included
China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain and the USA. There are 350 to 400 employees in
a Chinese factory and R&D is in Cambridge with manufacturing. The company spends 7% of
sales on in-house R&D.
                                                 
6 This case is largely based on IfM (2005).
7 Danaher (www.danaher.com) has a carefully considered strategy of acquisition centred around the
purchase of companies that have a ‘high performance potential’. They also acquire companies with
well-known trademarked brands, high market shares, a reputation for innovative technology, and
extensive distribution channels on which to build (IDCH, 1993). The three main qualities they seek in
acquisition targets are strong brands, market leadership and proprietary technology. Revenues
increased from $300 million to $1 billion within a decade and by 2004 the company was approaching
$7 billion and averaging dozens of acquisitions a year. The company has 35,000 employees (17,000 in
the US) and international sales from acquisitions (a total of 47 companies had been acquired for $3.4
billion).
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Xaar Group plc8
The Xaar Group plc spun off from CCL in 1990 and although the initial business plan was for
licensing only this has now been transformed to manufacturing since licensing was not
sustainable. The main sector of work is printing, ink jet, wide format graphics (posters),
involving the design and manufacture of ink jet print heads. It is a world leader in ink jet print
heads design and manufacture. For the Xaar Group plc some 20% of turnover goes into R&D
covering technology which is even higher than the figure given by Inca Digital Printings Ltd.
Following foundation in 1990 with £1m venture capital (VC) money, the first licence was
sold in 1991, followed by a second round of VC in 1992 (approximately £1.5m), and private
placement in 1996 which raised £12m. There was flotation in 1997 on the London Stock
Exchange (LSE), which raised £10m, and in 1999 the company bought MIT (an ex-IBM
licensee) and established manufacturing in Sweden. Whereas there were four employees in
1990 by mid 2004 there were about 250 employees with revenues of £30m in 2004. There are
two locations with prototyping in Cambridge and volume manufacturing in Sweden, and four
sales offices with two in China and one each in Japan and the USA.
Competition is mainly from own licensees and the main challenge is to expand into new
markets. The main market is wide format graphics, with Chinese machinery makers
dominant, and coding and marking was becoming significant in 2004. Over the whole period
the intellectual property rights (IPR) portfolio was continuously developed. Original strategic
intentions were to produce a dominant digital printing technology and this remained the same
in 2005. For the expansion of the market for digital printing active business development and
the promotion of new initiatives through joint ventures has been started. Xaar has found that
bootstrapping from an R&D company to a volume manufacturer is not easy and conservatism
in the market place has been an impediment, which Xaar has attempted to address.
Xennia Technology Ltd9
Xennia was founded in 1996 by Alan Hudd, ex Domino ink and R&D group leader, who saw
an opportunity in industrial ink jet from the drop on demand (DoD) techniques that were
being developed. The company was founded to provide ink formulation for DoD, although
the background of the founder was continuous ink jet. The company is in the industrial ink
jet, chemistry layered integrator sector and its activities include new solutions for
manufacturing companies, starting from fluids to provide solutions in hardware and software
for specific applications. It is a world leader in drop-on-demand industrial ink jet technology,
                                                 
8 This case is largely based on IfM (2005).
9 This case is largely based on IfM (2005).
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and provides its customers a one-stop shop for customised solutions for inks, hardware and
software as a total package. The firm has a breadth and knowledge of all print head types.
Xennia is independent and has specific expertise around "difficult" materials in ink jet
printing. These include dense or large inorganic materials like metals, phosphors, pigments,
biomedical fluids, structural scaffold materials, conductive inks and materials for displays.
The company is active in electronics, resistive, conductive displays, biomedical reagents,
enzymes, DNA materials for forensics, diagnostics for pregnancy tests, product decoration for
mobile phones, packaging and coatings (optical or protective). An interesting development
involving Xennia has been with Carcio, a British company which has pioneered a way to print
conductive inks with a digital inkjet printer. When Carcio was working on a way to customise
cell phones, by printing personal images on the plastic bodies, it commissioned Xennia to find
a way to print metallic inks with an inkjet printer. Xennia developed a novel approach which
could also print on copper. Carcio and Xennia formed a joint venture called CIT (Conductive
Inkjet Technology) to hold the patents for the new technology. The new printing technique
could have an important impact on the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) industry since
it could replace the etching process used for making copper antennas which creates toxic
waste and is expensive.
The firm employed 30 staff members and had an estimated value of £3.5m in 2004. Xennia
has grown organically without capital inputs from investors. The firm had one site at Royston.
Although in 2005 production was not important by 2006/7 it was considered to be significant
with relocation to Stevenage to facilitate manufacturing and accommodate the growth in the
number of employees. The company is not interested in products for markets but in delivering
customised solutions for specific customers. One of the major obstacles has been in recruiting
high-skilled foreign workers, due to government regulations. Competition is in the USA and
there are companies that are customers, partners and competitors at the same time. Therefore
relationships are complex where Xennia competes and co-operates simultaneously. All
Xennia's activities involve R&D and are paid for by clients and the company. Most of the
personnel are involved in R&D, which is mainly specific development work for clients and
contract research.
Inca Digital Printers Ltd10
Inca Digital Printers Ltd was founded in 2000 by Will Eve and Bill Baxter from Cambridge
Consultants Ltd. The business idea was to sell high end assembled printers through ink
                                                 
10 This case is largely based on IfM (2005).
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distributors, while retaining an excellent set of engineers to build machines. The founders
believed the ultimate selling point was in the "art" of assembly of super fast, efficient wide
format machines. They regarded it as an art, since empirical methods were still used, rather
than fluid mechanical mathematical models, and since engineering and assembly are reliant
upon the jetting of inks, they too are an "art" in this case. The company is in the industrial ink
jet printing sector, in particular wide format, and flatbed machines and it is a world leader in
flat bed printing for the signage market. Research and development (R&D) roots have
continued to play an important role in the business. The successful combination of R&D with
commercial awareness explains the success that the company has already had. Strength is in
the core technology for industrial ink jet printers and partners in its markets help it define
what customers need to take the product to market. It uses existing equipment (for handling
the product into and out of its printer) so that it can supply core print engines to its OEM
partners.
When the founders were at CCL, customers enquired if it was possible to print packaging at
the end of production lines. Following this a sample printer was made and it was exhibited at
Ipex 1998, when it became obvious that there was a clear opportunity to develop machines for
the display and signage markets. Inca Digital Printers began trading in 2000 and it progressed
through the normal rounds of private venture capital finance to 2004. It has around 100
employees and it had estimated sales of £18m in 2004. The company has one main site
located in Cambridge.
The original strategic intentions were to access the market though a distributor while retaining
excellent engineering staff. The distributor was an ink formulation and sales company since
consumables companies have good access to customers. Inca does not rely on IPR to protect
and build market share since it takes out patents where useful but it always underplays them.
Slightly less than 14% of sales are spent on R&D, with about 30% of Inca Digital's staff
working in R&D.
Inkski Ltd11
Inkski Ltd was founded in March 2004 by Dr. Daniel Hall, who following his PhD degree in
Computing Science at the University of Cambridge, had the idea of designing an innovative
digital print head which was initiated by his observation on ink drop ejection. In early 2004
Daniel Hall observed that ink drops can be transported in, and then ejected from, an
immiscible carrier liquid, with the carrier liquid imparting all the necessary momentum and
                                                 
11 This case is largely based on Feng (2008).
30
direction to the transported ink drop. From this simple observation, the ideas behind Inkski's
technology evolved, and with help from contacts in the University of Cambridge Cavendish
Laboratory, and initial funding from Providence Investment, Inkski was set up to start the
formal development and exploration of the technology. The company has received venture
capital and R&D grants in multiple rounds. When the company was founded Daniel Hall held
75% equity stake and venture funding of £25,000 from Providence Investment Company
representing 25% stake of the business. It then experienced another three rounds of venture
funding (by institutional investors, corporate investors (Xaar) and Cambridge business angel
investors), bringing the total institutional investment to £635,000, until the most recent
funding in 2007. The largest external investors in the company have been Providence
Investment Company and Xaar plc, with 26% and 9% of the business respectively.
These investments enabled further development of Inkski’s unique Light Initiated Liquid
Output (LILO) technology and protecting this intellectual property with patents, without
resources generated from production. By early 2005, a lab/workshop space had been
established in a light industrial unit and with a laser module installed. By late 2006 Inkski
started testing its system with a pico-second laser. By late 2007 the company demonstrated
the controlled ejection of conventional black pigmented ink onto a paper substrate. Towards
the end of 2007 the company had four patents covering its technology and intends to apply for
more as a result of further research and development. The patent plan had delayed the pace to
scale up as well as the progress of prototypes. The company contacted a German university
with a technology platform to help accelerate the production of prototypes. Inkski received
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) funded R&D grants in 2005 totalling £60,000
through EEDA (East of England Development Agency) over a 9 month period.
Inkski Ltd's technology has attracted the interest of a number of players in the Ink jet printing
industry which has helped the company to build a collaborative partnership and commercial
contacts with companies such as FUJIFILM and ManRoland. Since then the company has
faced challenges in its technology development and target market, both of which have
restricted its attractiveness to micro funds investors and potential customers. In relation to the
company's evolution and analysis of its outlook, key breakthrough and demonstration of
technology is considered to be the most important driver of future funding and long-term
success of the business.
